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Does the critical study of religion make its practitioners lose their 
faith? Inquiry into the proofs for God’s existence inevitably leads to 
agnosticism, as no such proof exists. If, however, we use the 
scientific method, and run an experiment on how philosophers of 
religion evaluate natural theological arguments for the existence of 
God, we could ask whether their belief or unbelief shape evaluation 
of natural theological arguments.  
This is exactly what Helen de Cruz and Johan de Smedt have 
done in a study found in this valuable anthology. They conclude:  
“Majority of philosophers of religion are theists” (135). They 
describe how philosophers of religion have chosen their field of 
specialization: “Self-selection might play a role in who decides to 
specialize in philosophy of religion: philosophers who believe that 
God exists might be more motivated to study the field than those 
who do not. After all, if God exists, philosophy of religion is one of 
the most important areas of philosophy” (ibid.).  
If only for this sentence, everyone should read this accessible and 
technically competent book. The book entices philosophers to 
engage in the study of religion as it traces the link between the 
cognitive science of religion and the empirical philosophy of religion 
to traditional material, both theistic and atheistic. The philosophy of 
religion can no longer be indifferent to empirical and experimental 
studies on religion, and it can no longer merely debate with the 
evidence but also produce new methods of engaging the scientific 
challenges to religious belief. 
The anthology is useful for it tells us the current definition of 
philosophy of religion: “Philosophy of religion examines questions 




about the existence and nature of God and other religious entities 
and about religion as a cultural and cognitive phenomenon.” 
Thomas Aquinas, one of the earliest practitioners of the discipline, 
thought that there were three sources of religious knowledge: 
reasoning, sacred texts, and tradition. Modern philosophy of religion 
emphasizes reason and science as key sources (1).  
The work asserts that the study of religion must involve the 
Cognitive Science of Religion: “CSR scholars hold that religious 
beliefs and practices are typically the result of evolved, ordinary 
cognitive biases and processes. A common dictum in CSR is that 
religion is natural” (4). Admittedly, natural as an idea is polysemic. 
CSR adherents, however, mean that unlike scientific knowledge, 
basic religious beliefs such as belief in life after death can be easily 
acquired through cultural evolution, which happens mostly in 
childhood and does not demand high cognitive effort (4).  John 
Wilkin’s essay entitled “Is Religion or Science Debunked by the 
Evolution of Cognitive Faculties?” understands possessing religious 
beliefs as undergoing an off-track process: “An “off-track process” 
is a process of the evolution by natural selection of cognitive 
dispositions or belief acquisition, in which what makes the 
dispositions or beliefs . . . fit is decoupled from its truth.”  For 
example, people in religious communities adhere to their beliefs not 
because they are convinced of the veracity of their beliefs, but 
because having the same beliefs as their fellows allows for greater 
“reciprocal altruism in times of need” (20). 
The book elucidates the limitations of the traditional practice of 
the philosophy of religion, describing it as: “too intellectualist 
(focused on beliefs), too insular (not enough engagement with other 
disciplines), and too narrow in the range of religious traditions that 
are typically discussed” (13). As a theist philosopher of religion, I 
would rather “take these criticisms to heart” than to contest them 




straightaway. As the philosophy of religion engages the questions of 
CSR, the point is not only to develop the field but religious practice 
itself.   
Despite the obvious discontinuity CSR takes from the classical 
and medieval sources, it nevertheless forms a continuity with them. 
“The Death We Fear is Not Our Own: The Folk Psychology of 
Souls Revisited and Reframed” has an extended discussion on 
Epicurus;  “How do Philosophers Evaluate Natural Theological 
Arguments” shows that CSR is not interested in debunking the 
claims of natural theological arguments, but in showing that  there’s 
an aspect to it [natural theological arguments] that can be explored  
through cognitive science. CSR’s claims obviously pose formidable 
challenges to the truth claims of traditional arguments, but as 
scientific discipline, it presupposes that while people’s beliefs 
(religious or not) may have cultural, sociological, and evolutionary 
explanations, a clear delineation remains between those explanations 
and the rationale of the traditional arguments. 
The anthology advances the study of religion because it uses the 
methods of science and genealogy to clarify the space for the 
reliance on science within the history of ideas: “We are concerned 
here with the cognitive aspect of religion, as a belief-producing 
process.” While CSR’s intention differs from genealogy, it 
participates in its over-all project: “However, at least one 
sociological account has been given of the belief-producing aspect 
of religion: Marx’s notion of ‘false consciousness’ and its heirs and 
successors.” Marx’s analyses of religion as an analgesic naturalizes 
religion. EDA [evolutionary debunking argument], however, goes a 
step further, and explains the nature of religion through evolution. 
CSR’s project, simply put, is akin to genealogy: “Evolutionary 
accounts are only one kind of genealogical account and evolutionary 




accounts include both sociological and biological explanations of 
religion” (26).  
The book, therefore, asks the radical question: “in the light of 
CSR results, are religious beliefs less likely to be reasonable, justified, 
or warranted? How if at all do CSR results challenge religious 
beliefs?” The essays included discuss the answers scholars have 
already presented: “There are three broad responses to the question 
of what, if anything, we can conclude from the evolutionary origins 
of religion and its psychological function.” Evolutionary debunking 
arguments propose that the rationality of religion weakens as CSR 
uncovers the psychological conditions of believers. Evolutionary 
justifications of religious belief, on the other hand, use CSR to argue for 
theological claims by giving empirical data. The third group of scholars argue that 
“the etiology of religious beliefs is irrelevant for their epistemic 
standing” (7).  
A theist reads this work not so much to present counter 
arguments for whatever claims it might have, which certainly will be 
produced by “apologists.” The book presents a broader 
development in philosophy, namely, experimental philosophy and 
empirical philosophy. Theistic philosophers should take these 
developments seriously, for it gives a second lease on life to the 
Humanities, whose conclusions continue to be required to have 
empirical basis. There is indeed a need to do a sociological study of 
where most believers are. Are religious believers interested in the 
truth and increasingly interested in values such as justice and 
equality? Gender and diversity form a large part of the discussions 
of the essays. The genealogy of CSR itself, which in understanding 
the “reasons” people have for their religious beliefs, will tell us that 
these reasons are not altogether rational. How people in dire straits 
think divergently from those in religious houses and air-conditioned  
 




libraries need to be articulated even more. Does, however, an 
empirical evidence necessarily make CSR more reasonable? If one 
gives empirical evidence that a belief is adhered to for reasons other 
than the cogency of the argument, is that necessarily more 
reasonable?  
The task here is not for religious thinkers to engage the empirical 
philosopher in a debate per se. The philosopher of religion is not 
engaged in these questions for purely philosophical reasons. He or 
she has already made a “fundamental option” (or a conscious 
option?) to believe in God, and so has launched on an intellectual 
journey.  The question is not how I, as a theist, argue against the 
challenges CSR presents to religious belief, but what the place is of 
these challenges to my own option to believe in a Christian God in 
the age of diversity (Apropos is the essay: “The Explanatory 
Challenge of Religious Diversity”). Furthermore, the study has no 
developed definition of belief and it does not clarify how religious 
beliefs are related to scientific beliefs. The index has no entry on 
belief, and gleaning from the portions that discuss religious beliefs, 
the book regards only the content of belief (terminus ad quem) and not 
the subjective side of it (terminus a quo). How does CSR explain the 
continued evolution within religious communities that have known 
dissent and innovation (cf. the phenomenon of emergent religions)? 
Arguably, the foregoing difficulties arise because the anthology 
presents belief and unbelief as hermetic positions rather than as 
dialectical and mutually beneficial. In other words, having studied 
religious belief as objective phenomenon, the CSR method might 
presuppose that unbelief itself is outside the process of belief 
acquisition. We find, however, a body of empirical studies in 
psychology of religion on the value of doubt to personal 
development and well-being.  There exist believers who became 
scientifically conscious. Rather than aiming to verify, they followed 




the process of falsification. At the outset, they asked themselves the 
question: what if one debunked his own belief through scientific 
evidence (e. g. what sort of archaeological evidence would disprove 
the Resurrection of Jesus)? This conscious believer, however, does 
not stop there. Realizing that what one had was an opinion held 
despite the lack of scientific evidence, would he or she find a “truth” 
in religious propositions that transcends rationalism itself? Could 
science itself enter the next phase of its evolution?  
This excellent volume is important because it makes us wonder 
about the kind of philosophical training future generations of 
theistic philosophers of religion should have. While they should 
have the spirit of an apologist (defensor fidei), such defense must be to 
learn from CSR.  An anti-scientific mind set would not do for our 
age nor would it serve the evolutionary purposes of religion itself.  
The systematic and critical study of religion does not make 
unbelievers of its practitioners. However theists shall confront 
cognitive science of religion, it will be for the greater evolution not 
only of religion but of nature itself.  
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